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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
PETE VICTOR MONTOYA, ] 
Defendant/Appellee. ; 
1 CASE NO. 20010458-SC 
I PRIORITY NO. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i) (1999). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes, rules, and constitutional 
provisions are relevant to this case, and their text is 
set forth in Addendum A: Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1999). 
ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION OF 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the trial court err in denying Mr. 
Montoya's motion for new trial based on new evidence? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial court's decision to deny 
a motion for a new trial is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard and this Court "assume[s] that the 
2 
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trial court exercised proper discretion unless the record 
clearly shows the contrary." State v. James, 819 P.2d 
781, 793 (Utah 1991) . 
PRESERVATION: This issue was raised in a motion 
before the trial court. R. 275. 
ISSUE NO. 2: Was Montoya denied effective assistance 
of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In challenging a conviction on 
the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, it is 
defendant's burden to show (1) that his counsel rendered 
a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and 
(2) that the outcome of the trial would probably have 
been different but for counsel's error. State v. Geary, 
707 P.2d 645 (Utah 1985); see also Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674-, 104 S. Ct. 
2052 (1984). This issue is properly raised for the first 
time on appeal. State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah 
App.1991). 
ISSUE NO. 3: Was there insufficient evidence to 
support Defendant's convictions for Criminal Homicide and 
Attempted Criminal Homicide? 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: An appellate court will reverse 
a conviction only when the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict, "is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime 
of which he was convicted." State v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d 
1328, 1330 (Utah App. 1990). 
PRESERVATION: This issue was raised in a motion for 
directed verdict. R. 386:42, 387:4. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Pete Montoya was charged by information with one 
count of Criminal Homicide, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1999), and two 
counts of Attempted Criminal Homicide, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1999). On November 8-14, 2000, 
Mr. Montoya was found guilty as charged after a jury 
trial before the Honorable Judge Timothy Hansen. On 
January 12, 2001, a Sentence, Judgment and Commitment was 
entered sentencing Montoya to a term of imprisonment of 
4 
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five years to life on Count I, and a term of imprisonment 
of one-to-fifteen years each on Counts II and II, the 
sentences to run consecutively, with a one-year firearm 
enhancement on each count. On January 2, 2001, Montoya 
filed a Motion for New Trial. On March 8, 2001, the trial 
court issued a memorandum order denying Montoya's Motion 
for a New Trial. On May 15, 2001, Montoya filed a Notice 
of Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the night of May 16, 1997, Kelly "Nick" Seal, Matt 
Seal, and Greg Ulibarri had gone to watch drag races, and 
were in a maroon Honda Civic belonging to Nick and Matt's 
mother. R. 384 at 3-20. Kelly was driving the car. R. 384 
at 26:21-23. Matt was sitting in the middle of the back 
seat of the car, and Greg was sitting in the front 
passenger seat. R. 384 at 1-3, R. 385 at 42:24-25, 43:1-
7, 44:4-10, 57:13-17. At around midnight, the boys left 
the place where the drag races were taking place, and 
went to an "Amoco Rainbo Mart" gas station to use the 
restroom and get a drink. R. 384 at 28:4-25, 29:11-12, 
385 at 57:7-25. The boys ran into someone Greg knew, 
5 
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named Monty, at the gas station, and talked to him for 
about five minutes. R. 384 at 29:23-25, 30:1-25. 
Matt noticed a Red GMC truck at the gas pumps 
"squealing it's tires." R. 384 at 31:1-13. It was 
stipulated at trial that the driver of the truck was 
Russell Thornwall. R. 385 at 82:7-16. The driver of the 
truck get out of the vehicle and begin to pump gas. R. 
384 at 32:15-18. At that point, Matt went inside the 
store. R. 384 at 75:4-10. Matt saw Pete Montoya inside 
the store. R. 384 at 41:4-9, 75:15-25. Matt did not know 
when Pete had entered the store, but simply ended up 
standing behind him in line at the cash register. R. 384 
at 75:11-25, 77:10-11. When Matt was in line with Pete 
inside the store, Pete did not speak to him, and Matt and 
Pete did not look at each other. R. 384 at 41:20-23. Pete 
was simply paying for a purchase when Matt saw him. R. 
384 at 41:18-19. Pete did not look at Matt, or call him 
names, or make any aggressive gestures toward him. R. 
384 at 77:15-23. 
Matt testified that after he came out of the store, 
and he and the other boys were talking to Monty, he saw 
6 
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the driver of the red truck "throwing up his hands," and 
yelling "VLT." R. 384 at 33:22-25, 78 at 3-8. Matt 
understood the hand gestures to be "threatening [them]", 
and he understood "VLT" to be the abbreviation of a 
gang. R. 384 at 34:7-12. During this time, Matt did not 
see Pete Montoya leave the store. R. 384 at 79:8-24. Matt 
testified that the boys ignored the driver of the truck, 
and left the gas station to head back to the races. R. 
384 at 35:13-24. 
Matt testified that right after the boys left the gas 
station, Kelly received a call on his pager and turned 
around and went back to the gas station to use the 
payphone there. R. 384 at 36:1-12. Kelly got out of the 
car and began to use the phone. R. 384 at 37:4-5. After 
a minute Greg got out of the car and also went to the 
payphone. R. 384 at 37:10-15. Matt stayed in the car, 
sitting in the back seat. R. 384 at 36:20-21, 37:18-19. 
Matt testified that the front passenger window was open, 
but the back windows were closed. R. 384 at 37:16-19. 
Matt testified that the driver of the red truck was 
"still yelling" at the time Kelly was using the 
7 
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payphones. R. 384 at 37:23-25, 38:1-2. Greg testified 
that this was the first time he noticed the red truck, 
and looked over and saw an individual pumping gas. R. 385 
at 62:8-9, 18-25. When Greg looked over at this 
individual, he "threw up his hands and started yelling at 
[Greg]." R. 385 at 63:5-24. Matt testified that he could 
no longer hear what the driver of the truck was saying, 
because of the distance. R. 384 at 38:3-10. Matt 
testified that he just "glanced at [the driver] really 
quick," and didn't see whether the driver was making any 
gestures at that time. R. 384 at 38:11-14. 
Kelly and Greg were at the payphones for about two 
minutes. R. 384 at 38:23-24. Before Kelly and Greg got 
back to their car, the red truck pulled up and stopped 
behind their car, a couple of car lengths away. R. 384 at 
39:1-17, 385 at 64:14-21. Matt noticed that the truck 
had pulled up behind them because it was "revving the 
engine." R. 384 at 83:23-25. Matt testified that the 
truck's passenger door was open, and "you could see the 
driver and the middle passenger." R. 384 at 39:18-25. 
Matt testified that the middle passenger "looked like he 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was in back seat/' R. 384 at 40:13-16, but that he 
couldn't tell for certain whether the middle passenger 
was in the back seat or the front seat. R. 384 at 87:1-
9. At trial Matt admitted that he told a police officer, 
in an interview shortly after the shooting, that "all 
three men were in the front seat." R. 385 at 10:17-25, 
11:18-25. When it was brought to Matt's attention at 
trial that he had previously said that all three men were 
in the front seat, he stated, "That's what it looked like 
to me." R. 385 at 12:1-5. Greg couldn't tell who was in 
the truck, but heard two or three voices yelling 
something from the truck. R. 385 at 65:9-18. 
As Matt looked back at the truck, he saw Pete Montoya 
leave the gas station store, walk past the boys' car and 
get into the front passenger seat of the red truck. R. 
384 at 40:1-2, 42:22-25, 43:1-9. When Pete walked passed 
the boys' car, he did not seem angry, and did not make 
any threatening gestures or any remarks. R. 384 at 84:9-
25, 85:1-9. Greg did not see Pete Montoya walk out form 
the store or get into the truck. R. 385 at 65:19-21. 
9 
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Kelly and Greg got back into the car, they were going 
to leave the gas station. R. 384 at 44:11-15, 385 at 
66:7-10. The truck was parked behind their car, and Matt 
heard the "revving" of the truck's engine. R. 384 at 
44:5-7. As the boys began to head for the exit of the gas 
station, the red truck started to follow them and then 
swerved toward them, almost hitting their vehicle. R. 
384 at 44:18-23. He testified that the truck was 
momentarily side-by-side with their vehicle, directly in 
front of the gas station doors. R. 384 at 44:24-25, 45:1-
5. 
Matt testified that the driver was yelling at them. 
R. 384 at 46:4-8. Matt testified that the front passenger 
was Pete Montoya. R. 384 at 45:13-15. He testified at 
trial that he saw the front passenger "leaning over, 
yelling also." R. 384 at 11-12. He also testified at 
trial that the front passenger was "leaning over the 
driver," and "looking right at [their] car." R. 384 at 
57:1-10. He testified that he "heard two or three voices" 
coming from the truck. R. 384 at 64:9-11. However, at a 
civil deposition taken eleven months after the shooting, 
W 
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Matt testified under oath that he didn't look at the 
occupants of the truck when the truck almost hit them, 
but that "we still seen they were behind us. Their 
headlights were shining in our car." R. 385 at 13:5-7, 
15:10-15, 17:11-25, 18:1-25. In fact, Matt testified at 
the civil deposition that the last time he actually saw 
the faces of the one of the occupants of the red truck 
was when the boys were at the pay phone, and the red 
truck was behind them and the driver was revving its 
engine. R. 385 at 20:7-20. 
Matt testified at trial that he heard the occupants 
of the truck yelling "VLT" and calling them "pussies." 
R. 384 at 45:16-18, 30:21-25, 31:1. However, at the civil 
deposition, Matt testified that although he could hear 
the occupants of the truck yelling, he could not hear 
anything in particular that they were saying. R. 385 at 
18:2-8. Matt testified at trial that the "middle 
passenger" was not doing or saying anything, as far as 
Matt could see. R. 384 at 46:9-12. In fact, Matt 
testified that he could not see the middle passenger at 
that time. R. 384 at 64:12-14. 
11 
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Kelly and the boys then began to leave the gas 
station by the west exit. R. 384 at 46:15-18. Matt 
testified that the red truck was following directly 
behind boys' vehicle, and headlights of the truck were 
shining right onto the them. R. 384 at 52:21-25, 53:1-7. 
Greg testified that the truck was directly "dead center" 
and about 15 feet behind their car as they were exiting 
the gas station. R. 385 at 80:8-21. As the boys were 
coasting out of the exit, turning left, Matt heard two or 
three gunshots. R. 384 at 54:9-16, 60:11-16. Greg 
testified that he heard two loud bangs. R. 385 at 70:3-
5 . • 
Matt testified at trial that the truck was "behind 
us, off to the right a little bit," when the shots were 
fired. R. 384 at 59:17-24, R. 384 at 59:17-25, 60:1-4. 
He testified that the truck took off "at a high rate of 
speed, revving the engine, turning right, squealing the 
tires." R. 384 at 60:7-8. He also testified that he 
heard someone shout, "VLT rules," as the truck sped away. 
R. 384 at 60:9-10, 65:1-8. Greg testified that after the 
shots were fired, he heard "a motor going up and tired 
12 
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screaming, off to the right of [him]." R. 385 at 90:1-3. 
After the shots were fired, the boys' car came to a 
stop in the middle of the road, R. 385 at 55:6-18, 
State's Exhibit 9. The car's back window, on the left 
and right side, and right pillar was hit by the gunshots. 
R. 384 at 54:16-25, 55:1-5, 61:15-25, State's Exhibit 6-
10. Matt did not see a gun. R. 384 at 62:18-22. Matt's 
brother Kelly Seal was shot once in the head, and died as 
a result of that injury. R. 384 at 60:19-22. Greg 
Ulibarri was hit by a bullet in the right side of his 
back. R. 384 at 63:13-19. Matt Seal was not hit by 
gunfire or injured. R. 384 at 55:25, 56:1-3, 63:11-12. 
Other Evidence in Support of Verdict 
In addition to the facts set forth above, based on 
the testimony of Greg Uliberri and Matt Seal, the State 
presented the following evidence in support of the 
verdict: 
Alicia Peterson 
Alicia Peterson testified that on the night of May 16 
and early morning hours of May 17, 1997, she went to the 
Amoco station with some friends, including a man named 
13 
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Monte. R. 385 at 109:12-24. While at the Amoco station, 
Alicia saw a red Chevy truck pull into the gas station 
and squeal its tires as it went from one side of the 
pumps to the other side. R. 110:22-25, 111:1-16. Alicia 
identified photographs of Russell Thornwall's truck as 
the truck she saw that night. R. 385 at 114:6-25. State's 
Exhibit's 3 and 4. Alicia saw someone pumping gas into 
the truck. R. 385 at 112:10-24. She also saw people get 
out of the truck and go inside the store. R. 385 at 
112:2-4, 128:17-20. She saw someone sitting on the 
passenger side of the truck who was using a cell phone. 
R. 385 at 113:19-25, 129:18-25. She described the 
individual who used the cell phone as having dark, short 
hair. R. 385 at 113:24-25. She thought there was a third 
person in the truck, but she could not recall what he 
looked like. R. 385 at 114:3-5. 
Alicia and her friends left the gas station, but 
returned a few minutes later, and saw the red Honda in 
the middle of the street, and Greg Uliberri was leaving 
the vehicle. Alicia had some contact with Greg and 
learned that he had been shot. She testified that Greg 
14 
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told her, "They were showing, giving us gang signs." R. 
385 at 121:20-25, 122:1-3. 
In 1999, Alicia identified Russell Thornwall and Pete 
Montoya from a photo lineup as individuals who were 
involved with the red truck that night. R. 385 at 122:4-
25, 123:1-3. State's Exhibit 24. She rated her certainty 
regarding Thornwall (in photo 24-B) as someone who was 
involved with the red truck as an 8 on a scale of 1-10, 
and of Pete Montoya (in photo 26-A) as a 5, on a scale of 
1-10. R. 385 at 123:24-25, 124:1-3, 133:11-25, 134:5-19, 
174:6-11. Although Alicia believed one of these two 
individuals was pumping gas and one talking on a cell 
phone, she was not certain which of the two was doing 
what. R. 385 at 124:11-16, 126:12-15. Alicia also picked 
a photo from another group of photos as another 
individual, Ronnie Ontiveros, as being involved with the 
red truck. R. 385 at 124:17-25, 125:1-19, 134:17-25, 
135:1-6, 174: 12-13. State's Exhibit 25-B. She rated Mr. 
Ontiveros an 8, on a scale of 1-10, as far as her 
certainty. R. 385 at 134:16-25, 135:1-6, 174:12-13. 
15 
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Rob Nielson 
Sheriff Rob Nielson testified that he had an 
encounter with Russell Thornwall on June 20, 2000. R. 
385 at 136:6-25, 137:1-2. Nielson attempted to do a 
felony stop on the vehicle that Thornwall was in, and 
Thornwall exited the vehicle and ran on foot. R. 385 at 
137:5-10. Thornwall fired several rounds at Nielson's 
vehicle and at Nielson. R. 385 at 137:12-15. Thornwall 
used his right hand to fire the shots at Nielson. R. 385 
at 137:18-20. Thornwall ran behind a building and shot 
himself in right side of the head. R. 385 at 138:4-10. 
John Campbell 
John Campbell was a police officer who was called to 
the scene of the shooting at issue in this case. R. 385 
at 139:17-25, 140:1-25. Campbell observed and made a 
diagram of the crime scene. R. 385 at 141:17-25. State's 
Exhibit 27, Defendant's Exhibit 41. Although Campbell 
made various measurements from a "reference point," the 
reference point's location has no particular 
significance. R. 385 at 144:4-18. Campbell recovered 
two bullet casings from the crime scene at the points 
16 
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marked 1 and 2 on his diagram. R. 385 at 148:10-25, 
149:1-3, State's Exhibits 29 and 30. The points at which 
the bullet casings were found were marked by orange cones 
in photographs taken at the scene. R. 385 at 151:8-24, 
State's Exhibit 34, 43. Campbell testified that there was 
sufficient room for a car, exiting and heading south, to 
drive between the casing and the curb. R. 385 at 160:20-
23. 
Campbell also took photographs of the car's interior, 
showing a bullet entry "wounds" on the passenger's side 
of the car, the back of the front passenger's seat, and 
the back seat of the car where the bullet passed through 
before entering the passenger's seat. R. 385 at 152:17-
25, 153:1-25, 154:1-6. State's Exhibits 35-39. Campbell 
also took photographs of the outside of. the vehicle 
showing the bullet entry "wound" into the right portion 
of the vehicle, and the shattered back window. R. 385 at 
154:15-25. State's Exhibits 6, 9,10. Officer Campbell 
testified that he was unable to determine exactly how 
many bullets pierced the car, but knew that at least two 
had pierced the car, and perhaps up to four hit the car. 
17 
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R. 385 at 155:23-25, 385 at 163:6-17. Campbell testified 
that the bullet that entered the right rear of the car 
appeared to have traveled through the back seat, into the 
front passenger's seat, and hit the front passenger. R. 
385 at 156:1-12. The back window was broken by another 
bullet. R. 385 at 13-16. Officer Campbell believed that 
the bullet that broke the rear window was the one that 
killed Kelly Seal. R. 385 at 158:12-17. Defendant's 
Exhibit 40. 
Richard Montanez 
Richard Montanez, a detective with the Salt Lake 
Metro Gang Unit, got involved in the investigation of the 
instant case in February of 1999, after receiving leads 
from confidential informants. R. 385 at 166:1-29. 
Through these leads, detective Montanez was able to 
verify that the red truck from which the shots were fired 
belonged to Russell Thornwall. R. 385 at 166:15-25. It 
was stipulated at trial that the truck did indeed belong 
to Russell Thornwall- Id. Detective Montanez also 
identified a picture of Pete Montoya, and a tattoo on 
Pete Montoya's arm which said, "VLT." R. 168:11-21, 
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State's Exhibits 1, 2. Detective Montanez testified 
that Pete Montoya was right-handed, R. 385 at 169:6-21, 
and it was stipulated at trial that Pete Montoya was 
right-handed. R. 385 at 169:22-24. 
Detective Montanez located and inspected the truck 
that was used in the shooting. R. 385 at 176:24-25, 
177:1-25, 1781-4. He described and diagramed the truck's 
interior, including the front bench seat and back bench 
seat. R. 385 at 179:4-9, and a gear shifter of 
approximately 2 feet in length in the center of the floor 
in the front. R. 385 at 179:10-20. State's Exhibit 44. 
Detective Montanez testified that he is right-handed 
and typically shoots with his right hand. R. 385 at 
181:2-10. He testified that although he has shot a gun 
with his left hand, it is "less accurate" being his 
"weaker hand." R. 385 at 181:10-16. 
Matt Sotuyo 
Matt was working as a store clerk at the Amoco 
station the night of the shooting. R. 386 at 32:18-25, 
33:1-11, 34:13-25. Matt heard two gunshots and then saw 
the red truck speeding out of the station, heading 
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southbound. R. 386 at 34:22-25, 35:1-8. Matt could see 
the passenger side of the truck as it sped out of the 
parking lot. R. 386:6-13. Matt did not see anything 
sticking out of the passenger window. R. 386 at 37:13-
22. Matt saw the passenger looking back, as if to see 
what happened, and then turning back around. R. 386 at 
38:7-18. 
Dr. Grey 
Dr. Todd Grey is the Chief medical Examiner for the 
State of Utah. R. 385 at 45:9-14. Dr. Grey performed an 
autopsy on Kelly Nicholas Seal on May 17, 1997. R. 385 
at 46:8-11. Dr. Grey testified that Kelly died from a 
gunshot wound to the back of the head. R. 385 at 47:19-
23, 48:14-15. He also testified that the size of the 
projectile which caused the gunshot wound was "anywhere 
from . . . a .32 to a .30 caliber." R. 385 at 47:6-12. 
He also testified that the projectile entered the back of 
the head a little to the right of the mid-line, and 
lodged just above the left eye. R. 385 at 47:16-23. Dr. 
Grey could not determine the distance from which the 
shot was fired, but could say from the that it was fired 
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from distance of over three feet. R. 385 at 3-8. The 
autopsy report, State's Exhibit 17, and some diagrams of 
the injuries, State's Exhibits 18-20, supported Dr. 
Grey's testimony. Dr. Grey testified that he could not 
determine the position of the shooter in relation to the 
victim, and stated, "Whether the person was turning and 
the shooter was to their side versus they were looking 
straight ahead and the shooter behind them, I cannot tell 
you." R. 385 at 53:4-10, 53:21-25, 54:1-5. Dr, Grey 
testified that it was his opinion that the bullet that 
killed Kelly passed through glass, and not metal, before 
it struck Kelly. R. 385 at 55:4-14. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion by denying Mr. 
Montoya's Motion for New Trial where the proposed new 
evidence, a witness who stated that he was the front seat 
passenger in Russelll Thornwall's truck and saw Russell 
Thornwall fire the gun, could not have been with 
reasonable diligence discovered and produced at trial by 
counsel, and would clearly result in the probability of 
a different outcome at trial. In the alternative, if 
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this Court finds that trial counsel could have discovered 
and produced the new evidence with reasonable diligence, 
then Montoya received ineffective assistance of counsel 
when his trial counsel failed to exercise reasonable 
diligence to discover and produce critical defense 
witnesses. Finally, there was insufficient evidence to 
support Montoya's convictions for Homicide and Attempted 
Homicide where the evidence only established Montoya's 
presence in the vehicle and his brief participation in a 
verbal altercation, and was simply inconclusive with 
regards to who actually fired the gun. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Erred When it Denied Montoya's 
Motion for a New Trial. 
Mr. Montoya, through his trial counsel, filed a 
motion for a new trial on January 22, 2001, approximately 
one month after the trial in this matter, asserting that 
critical new evidence had become known to defense 
counsel. R. 276-280. This evidence consisted of the 
statements of two witnesses: One witness stated to 
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defense investigators that he was the third passenger in 
the red truck the night of the shooting, and that he was 
the front seat passenger that night, not Pete Montoya, 
and that he was using a cell phone during the time 
Thornwall began yelling at the victims, and that Russell 
Thornwall was the shooter. R. 281-283. This witness's 
identity was not revealed in Montoya's Motion for New 
Trial, apparently based on an agreement with Montoya's 
trial counsel and defense investigators that the witness 
would give a statement only if his identity was not 
revealed. R. 284-287. The second witness was Jason 
Thornwall, Russell Thornwall's brother, who stated that 
Russell talked to him about the instant case, and said: 
"Pete Montoya is in jail for something I did." R. 288-
289. 
In State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 545 (Utah 1994), 
this Court noted that a "trial court has a wide range of 
discretion in determining whether newly discovered 
evidence entitles a litigant to a new trial." The 
Goddard court added, "[i]f the trial court's decision is 
within the limits of responsibility, we will uphold it." 
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Id. (citing State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 
1992) ) . The Goddard court also set out a three-part test 
which must be met in order to grant a new trial based on 
new evidence, as follows: (1) The new evidence must such 
as could not with reasonable diligence have been 
discovered and produced at trial; (2) it must not be 
merely cumulative, and (3) it must be such as to render 
a different result probable on the retrial of the case. 
Goddard at 545 (internal citations omitted). 
The three-prong test was clearly met in the instant 
case. Montoya's trial attorney submitted an affidavit to 
the court setting forth his extensive efforts to locate 
the witness who was a passenger in the red truck that 
night. R. 284-287. The affidavit also sets forth the 
circumstances under which Montoya's trial counsel 
learned, by sheer chance, and after the trial, that 
Russell Thornwall had made an incriminating statement to 
his brother. R. 284-287. 
Moreover, the testimony of the proposed witnesses was 
not merely cumulative, and was clearly such as to "render 
a different result probable on retrial." The 
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prosecution's theory at trial was that Pete Montoya was 
the shooter, although there was no direct evidence in 
that regard. The prosecution relied on Mr. Montoya's 
position as front seat passenger to argue that only he, 
of the three individuals in the truck, could have fired 
the shots. The new witness would testify that he was the 
front seat passenger in the truck, and that Russell 
Thornwall was the shooter. The witness's statement is 
especially credible because, by testifying in that 
manner, he would place himself in the exact same position 
of Pete Montoya with regards to possible criminal 
prosecution. With regards to Jason Thornwall, his 
statement that Russell Thornwall told him that Pete was 
in jail for something Russell did supports the 
confidential witness's statement in that regard. 
Clearly, these witnesses, and especially the witness 
who was a passenger in the truck that night, were 
critical to Mr. Montoya's defense. Trial counsel, through 
affidavits, established that diligence was exercised to 
locate this witness, and that the witness could not have 
been discovered or produce prior to trial. Accordingly, 
25 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Montoya's motion for a new trial. 
11. Montoya Received Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel. 
If this Court finds that the new evidence could have 
been discovered and produced for trial with "reasonable 
diligence," then Montoya clearly received ineffective 
assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to 
exercise reasonable diligence.1 
Generally, to successfully claim ineffective 
assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy a 
two-part test established by the Supreme Court in 
Strickland and recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in 
State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984). Under this 
test, a defendant must show (1) that counsel's 
performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient 
Generally, an appellant cannot raise an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim for the first time on 
appeal because the trial record is insufficient to 
allow the claim to be determined. See State v. 
Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991). An 
appellant, however, can raise such a claim if the trial 
record is adequate to permit determination of the issue 
and there is new counsel on appeal. Id.; State v. 
Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah App.1991). 
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performance prejudiced the defense. See Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; Lairby, 699 P.2d at 
1203-04. 
To show counsel's performance was deficient, a 
defendant must identify counsel's specific acts or 
omissions that "fall outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance." State v. Frame, 723 
P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. To show prejudice, a 
defendant must show that "counsel's errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a 
trial whose result is reliable." Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct. 
at 2064. Under this prong of the test, the defendant must 
show that a "reasonable probability" exists that the 
trial result would have been different if counsel had 
not erred. Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068; Frame, 723 
P.2d at 405. "A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the reliability of 
the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 
2068; Lairby, 699 P.2d at 1205-06. 
In the instant case, trial counsel failed to discover 
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and produce the only eyewitness to the actual shooting, 
besides the defendant himself. Neither Matt Seal nor Greg 
Ulibarri saw the gun, and neither of them knew who fired 
the shots. The State relied on circumstantial evidence, 
primarily based on testimony from Matt Seals that Pete 
Montoya was the front seat passenger in the truck. The 
third occupant of the truck would have testified that he, 
not Pete Montoya, was the front seat passenger, and that 
Russell Thornwall was the shooter. Although trial counsel 
submitted an affidavit setting forth his extensive 
efforts to locate this witness, trial counsel did not 
request a continuance in order to locate this critical 
witness, and in fact opposed the State's request for a 
continuance. 
In State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the 
Utah Supreme Court recognized that the failure to conduct 
a reasonable investigation into possible defense 
witnesses constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Templin at 188 (internal quotations omitted). In Templin, 
counsel's inadequate representation was deemed 
prejudicial where the prospective witnesses would have 
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provided testimony that contradicted the testimony of the 
State's main witness against the defendant. Id. The 
Templin court noted that such testimony was particularly 
important "because it affect[ed] the credibility of the 
only witness who gave direct evidence of defendant's 
guilt,[and thus] affect[ed] the entire evidentiary 
picture." Id. 
In the instant case, the testimony of the proposed 
witness would not only have affected the credibility of 
Matt Seal, with regards to Pete Montoya's location within 
the vehicle, but would have provided the only testimony 
as to who actually fired the shots that killed Kelly Seal 
and wounded Greg Ulibarri. Clearly, such testimony is 
even more critical than that described in Templin, and 
the failure to discover and produce this witness, or to 
request a continuance for the purpose of doing so, 
clearly constituted prejudicial error by Montoya's trial 
counsel. 
In sum, the overall effect of counsel's error clearly 
and plainly prejudiced Montoya's defense, and severely 
"undermines confidence in the reliability of the 
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outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 
2068; Lairby, 699 P.2d at 1205-06. 
3. The Trial Court Erred When it Denied Appellant's 
Motion for Directed Verdict. 
Motions for directed verdicts in criminal proceedings 
are governed by U.C.A., 1953, § 77-17-3 and Rule 17 (o) of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (U.C.A., 1953, § 77-
35-17 (o)) . Section 77-17-3 requires the immediate 
discharge of a defendant M[w]hen it appears to the court 
that there is not sufficient evidence to put a defendant 
to his defense." Rule 17 (o) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure authorizes the dismissal of an entire 
information or indictment, or any count thereof, either 
at the end of State's evidence or at the close of all the 
evidence " upon the ground that the evidence is not 
legally sufficient to establish the offense charged 
therein or any lesser included offense." 
The standard for determining whether an order denying 
a motion for directed verdict is erroneous is the same as 
that applied by an appellate court in determining whether 
a jury verdict should be set aside for insufficient 
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evidence. Under that standard, a trial court may arrest 
a jury verdict when the evidence, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so 
inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
as to that element. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 
(Utah 1983); State v. McCardell. 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 
1982); State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976). 
A. Count I 
Count I charged Pete Montoya with Criminal Homicide, 
Murder, under Section 76-5-203 of the Utah Code, alleging 
that Mr. Montoya: 
Intentionally or knowingly caused the death of 
Kelly N. Seal and/or intending to cause serious 
bodily injury to another, committed an act 
dangerous to human life that caused the death of 
Kelly N. Seal, and/or acting under circumstances 
evidencing depraved indifference to human life, 
engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of 
death to another, and thereby caused the death 
of Kelly N. Seal, and [that a dangerous weapon 
as used, giving rise to enhanced penalties.] 
In reviewing all of the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, and all of the inferences that 
can reasonably be drawn from such evidence, it is clear 
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that the evidence that Pete Montoya was the shooter is so 
lacking that "reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt." 
It was undisputed at trial that Russell Thornwall 
instigated a an altercation with the victims in this 
case, yelling at them, throwing up his hands, and 
maneuvering his truck in an aggressive manner while Pete 
Montoya was inside the gas station. It is undisputed that 
Russell Thornwall was the driver of the truck, and that 
Russell followed the boys as they began to leave the gas 
station and veered toward them, nearly colliding with 
them. Shots were fired from Thornwall's truck, which 
killed Kelly Seal and injured Greg Ulibarri, but none of 
the State's witnesses saw the gun or knew who had fired 
the gun. The following is a review of the evidence 
linking Pete Montoya to the shooting: 
1. Presence 
The evidence showed that Pete Montoya was a passenger 
in the red truck driven by Russell Thornwall at the time 
of the shooting. 
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2 . Position in the truck 
Although the evidence was contradictory regarding 
Pete Montoya's position in the truck, Matt Seal testified 
at trial that he saw Pete Montoya walk out of the store 
and get into the passenger side of the truck. 
3. Yelling 
Matt Seal testified that, at the moment when Russell 
Thornwall drove his truck aggressively toward the boys' 
Honda and nearly collided with them, he looked up and saw 
Pete Montoya leaning forward and yelling something, along 
with Russell Thornwall. He testified that he heard two or 
three voices yelling "pussies" and "VLT." Greg Ulibarri 
also testified that he heard two or three voices yelling 
something from the truck, both at the payphones and at 
the time of the near collision. 
4. Physical Evidence 
The prosecution's case relied heavily on arguments 
that the path of the bullets, which followed a slight 
right to left path, could not have been fired from the 
driver's side of the vehicle. Yet, the evidence regarding 
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the location of the truck when the bullets were fired was 
simply inconclusive. Although Greg Ulibarri testified 
that the truck was "dead center" and about 15 feet behind 
them when he glanced up, this was prior to the bullets 
being fired. Greg testified that as Kelly began to turn 
left, out of the exit, he heard two loud bangs. Matt 
testified that he saw the truck's headlights directly 
behind their car as they exited the gas station, and that 
the truck was "behind [them], off to the right a little 
bit," when the shots were fired. Both Matt and Greg 
testified that after the shots were fired they saw or 
heard the truck speeding off to the right of them. 
Clearly, the testimony of Greg and Matt merely 
establishes that the truck was behind them prior to the 
shots being fired, and the truck raced off the right 
after the shots were fired. The evidence does show 
however that the boys' car was in motion when the shots 
were fired, and that the truck may have been in motion 
when the shots were fired, and was definitely in motion 
immediately after the shots were fired. The testimony of 
Greg and Matt simply does not pinpoint the position of 
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the truck in relation to the car at the moment of the 
shooting, and thus simply does not support the State's 
argument that the shots had to have been fired by the 
passenger in order to create the slight right-to-left 
angle of the bullet's path. If the boys' car was turning 
left and the truck was veering right at the precise 
moment of the shooting, the right-to-left path of the 
bullets could have easily been attributed to the driver 
of the truck, or even to the middle passenger. Moreover, 
the location of the bullet casings, as shown in State's 
Exhibits 34 and 43, simply does not establish that the 
shots must have been fired by the front seat passenger, 
rather than the driver or the middle passenger. 
The State also argued that Russell Thornwall could 
not have fired the shots while he was driving the vehicle 
and changing gears. But according to the testimony of 
Matt Seals and Greg Ulibarri, Thornwall began racing away 
and squealing his tires after the shots were fired and 
not before. It is common knowledge that there are drive-
by shootings, and that drivers of vehicles are able to 
fire shots as they maneuver a vehicle. In this case, 
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Thornwall was stopped behind the boys' vehicle, and was 
moving slowly, if at all, when the shots were fired. 
Moreover the State's theory that Pete Montoya was the 
shooter clearly required him to lean partially out of the 
window to fire shots across the hood of the truck, and 
yet, Matt Sutoyo testified that he looked up at the 
moment he heard the gunshots and did not see anyone or 
anything hanging or leaning out of the passenger side 
window. 
In sum, the evidence simply showed that shots were 
fired from Thornwall's truck, and that Pete Montoya was 
present in the truck and may have joined the verbal 
altercation in which Thornwall was engaged with the 
victims. The evidence simply does not implicate Pete 
Montoya as the shooter over the other two occupants of 
the truck. This is a case where the evidence "is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted." State v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328, 1330 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
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B. Counts II and III 
Counts II and III charged Pete Montoya with Attempted 
Criminal Homicide, under Section 76-5-203 of the Utah 
Code, alleging that Mr, Montoya "intentionally and 
knowingly attempted to cause the death of Matt Seal" in 
Count II, and "intentionally and knowingly attempted to 
cause the death of Greg Ulibarri" in Count III. 
As argued above, there was insufficient evidence to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Pete Montoya was the 
shooter. But even assuming, for argument's sake that 
there was sufficient evidence to show that Mr. Montoya 
was the shooter, there was simply no evidence that Pete 
Montoya intended to kill Matt Seal or Greg Ulibarri. 
The evidence, as outlined above, shows that someone 
in the red truck shot gunfire at the back of the Honda. 
Although intent can usually be inferred from 
circumstantial evidence, see State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 
378, 381 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (aiming gun at victim for 
five to seven seconds was sufficient evidence of intent 
to kill) , in this case there was simply no evidence 
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whatsoever that Pete Montoya intended to kill Matt Seal 
or Greg Ulibarri. As stated above, the evidence simply 
showed that Pete Montoya joined in a verbal altercation 
that was commenced by Russell Thornwall, and that someone 
fired gunshot at the rear of the victim's vehicle. 
Moreover, the evidence simply does not show that three 
shots were fired at the boys' car. John Campbell 
testified that he recovered two bullet casings from the 
scene of the shooting. He testified that he could not 
determine the number of shots fired, but that at least 
two, and perhaps four, shots were fired. Greg Ulibarri 
testified that he heard two loud bangs. Matt Seal 
testified that he heard two or three shots. Matt Sotuyo 
testified that he heard two gunshots. Clearly, at the 
very least, the State would have to have shown that three 
shots were fired in order to convict Pete Montoya of 
attempted homicide of Greg Ulibarri and Matt Seal. 
Moreover, there was no evidence that the gun was aimed at 
anything other than the vehicle in general. 
Clearly, the evidence of Pete Montoya's intent to 
kill Matt Seal and Greg Ulibarri "is sufficiently 
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inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." 
State v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328, 1330 (Utah App. 1990). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Montoya respectfully asserts 
that he was wrongfully convicted of Homicide and 
Attempted Homicide, and requests that his conviction be 
vacated. 
an" 
DATED this Ju day of September, 2002. 
SHARON PRESTON 
Attorney for Pete Montoya 
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rage 1 ui 1 
76-5-203. Murder. 
(1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means: 
(a) violation of Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5, Clandestine Drug Lab Act; 
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is younger than 18 years of age; 
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301; 
(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1; 
(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302; 
(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1; 
(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3; 
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1; 
(i) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404; 
(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse of a child under Section 76-5-404.1; 
(k) rape under Section 76-5-402; 
(1) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2; 
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403; 
(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405; 
(o) arson under Section 76-6-102; 
(p) aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103; 
(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202; 
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203; 
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301; 
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302; or 
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8-309. 
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if: 
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the 
death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, the actor engages in conduct which creates a 
grave risk of death to another and thereby causes the death of another; 
(d) (i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the commission or attempted 
commission of any predicate offense, or is a party to the predicate offense; and 
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed in the course of the commission, attempted commission, or 
immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense; 
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer while in the commission or attempted commission of: 
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4; or 
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest under Section 76-8-305 if the actor uses force against a peace 
officer; 
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the offense is reduced pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(3); or 
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is established under Section 76-5-205.5. 
(3) Murder is a first degree felony. 
(4) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder that the defendant caused the death of another or 
attempted to cause the death of another: 
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse; or 
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or excuse for his conduct although the conduct 
was not legally justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances. 
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a)(i) emotional distress does not include: 
(i) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305; or 
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct. 
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection (4)(a)(i) or the reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection 
4)(a)(ii) shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances. 1 
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows: 
(i) murder to manslaughter; and 
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter. 
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